



USE OF BIG DATA ANALYTICS AND SENSOR 
TECHNOLOGY IN CONSUMER INSURANCE CONTEXT- 
LEGAL AND PRACTICAL CHALLENGES   
 
 
Insurers are increasingly utilising big data analytics and artificial intelligence in rating risks and 
customising insurance products particularly in consumer insurance context. The primary aim of this 
article is to elaborate to what extent the legal rules in force could ensure that consumers are not treated 
unfairly as a result of the use of such disruptive technologies. Relevant insurance law principles and 
doctrines are also considered as part of this analysis. The article concludes that despite the protection 
provided to consumers by data and consumer protection legislation, unregulated and unlimited use of 
data analytics and algorithms in the risk assessment process could create significant difficulties for 
consumers. It is argued that further regulation, especially making regular audits essential for insurers 
employing such technologies in risk assessment process, is required. The article also finds that the use 
of artificial intelligence in customising insurance products does not present similar degree of difficulties 






“Big data” in the consumer insurance context refers to the enormous data sets at the disposal 
of insurance providers which enable them to engage in cost effective, innovative forms of 
information processing for enhanced insight and decision-making.1 This is normally made 
possible by algorithms capable of identifying patterns in the vast amount of data sets available. 
Once a pattern reliably emerges from the examination of data sets, it can be used as the basis 
 
1  As indicated by D. Boyd and K. Crawford, “Critical Questions for Big Data: Provocations for a Cultural, 
Technological and Scholarly Phenomenon” (2012) 15 Info. Comm. & Soc’t 662, 663, “big data is less about data 
that is big than it is about a capacity to search, aggregate and cross-reference large data sets.”      
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for the operation of predictive analytics.2 Machine learning plays a vital role in predictive 
analytics. It is one of the main ways in which artificial intelligence is being applied, with 
algorithms that can learn from examples and can improve their performance with more data 
over time.3 Out of several machine learning models that exist, neural networks4 and Bayesian 
networks,5 are the ones often employed by insurers as part of risk assessment process.6   Having 
learned from the new data and refined correlations, the algorithms are then able to fine tune 
their predictive power as well as making automated decisions. This is known as “deep machine 
learning”, which is a branch of machine learning relying on complex statistical models and 
algorithms with multiple layers of parallel processing that loosely model the way the biological 
 
2   Predictive analytics is a branch of analytics concerned with making predictions on the risk and probabilities 
of future events. Insurers have been utilising the basic principles of predictive analytics for decades, but today 
it is mainly used to produce reliable reports, which accurately identify levels of risk and aid in underwriting 
and policymaking by utilising a wide variety of methods, including data mining, predictive modelling, statistics, 
machine learning and artificial intelligence.  
3 See PwC, Explainable AI: Driving Business Value through Greater Understanding, (2018) 
<https://www.pwc.co.uk/audit-assurance/assets/explainable-ai.pdf> accessed on 1 June 2021.  
4  The idea behind artificial neural networks is to stimulate aspects of the behaviour of neurons in the human brain 
using the so-called perceptron algorithm. For a more technical explanation of how such networks operate, see, S. 
J. Kwon (ed), Artificial Neural Networks, (New York 2011).          
5  Bayesian networks are often used for decision making. For a more comprehensive and technical explanation of 
how such networks operate, see, A. Darwiche, Modelling and Design with Bayesian Networks, (Cambridge 2009). 
For a non-technical explanation of how different machine learning algorithms work, see, S. Haddadin and D. 
Knobbe, “Robotics and Artificial Intelligence” published in M. Ebers and S. Navas (ed), Algorithms and Law 
(Cambridge 2020), 21-24.            
6  For the basic theory behind such models, see, F. Rosenballt, “The Percepton: A Probabilistic Model for 
Information Storage and Organisation in the Brain” (1958) 65 Psychological Review 386.  
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brain works and is utilised by insurers when analysing vast amount of data they gather on 
potential cover holders. 
     In addition to big data analytics, insurers today utilise various sensor technologies to obtain 
regular and real time data from insurance subjects, which is often used not only as part of risk 
assessment exercise but also as the basis of offering individualised insurance products for their 
customers. For example, telematics, which is often plugged into the on-board diagnostic port 
of a vehicle,7 collects information on driving behaviour, including geographical position, 
speed, acceleration and breaking severity, vibration and impact events, and forwards it to motor 
insurers. Some home and contents insurers provide their customers the opportunity (and often 
incentives in the shape of discounts) to use home telematics, which are often connected to 
smoke alarms, carbon monoxide detectors, smart locks and doors and windows, and transmitted 
to inform insurers or customers instantly in case of an irregularity. Similarly, some life and 
health insurers provide wearables to their customers that gather and transmit real-time data 
about blood pressure, blood sugar and heart rate to insurers.8 Such wearables can also be used 
to monitor various aspects of an individual’s wellbeing, including diet, weight, sleep and 
exercise.  
It is envisaged that these new technologies have the potential to transform the insurance 
industry and customer experience particularly in two ways: 
 
7  The same outcome can be achieved by installing an on-board diagnostic device (commonly known as a “black 
box”) that is equipped with a SIM card to transmit data over the mobile network.     
8  Wearable personal technology is sometimes referred to as “fit tech”. 
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i) The growing amount of data, increasing computing power and big data 
analytics allow insurance companies to identify risks in a much more granular 
and sophisticated manner (also known as “risk individualisation”); and    
ii) The use of sensor technology enable the gathering of real-time and 
personalised data, allowing insurance companies to customise insurance 
products (also known as “risk customisation”).9 
It is anticipated that application of these new technologies could pose significant 
practical and legal hazards for consumers.10 Broadly speaking, the primary objective of this 
article is to evaluate whether current regulatory environment is fit to provide the desired 
protection for consumers.  
There is no doubt that regulating artificial intelligence has been on the agenda of 
regulators for the last decade. Recently, for example, the European Commission has published 
a formal proposal for an EU Regulation to establish a uniform regulatory framework to deal 
 
9  It is also possible that algorithms and artificial intelligence employed to manage claims and detect fraudulent 
patterns might function not in the manner programmed creating doubts on legitimate claims and leading ultimately 
rejection of such claims by insurers. This could lead to delays in the settlement process but one assumes that such 
mishaps can be addressed by insurers especially if affected individuals challenge the decisions reached with the 
aid of algorithms and raise complaints to authorities of the claim settlement processed employed.                 
10  Some of these issues have been considered in other jurisdictions (e.g. T. E. Spahn, “Is Your Artificial 
Intelligence Guilty of the Unauthorised Practice of Law?” (2018) 24 Rich. J. L. & Tech. 1; F. Thouvenin; F. Suter; 
D. George; R.H. Weber, “Big Data in the Insurance Industry” (2019) 209 and R. Swedloff, “The New Regulatory 
Imparative for Insurance” (2020) Boston College Law Review 2033) but as of today no comprehensive academic 
analysis has been carried out on the potential impact of big data from the perspective of law applicable in England 




with artificial intelligence systems.11 Under these proposals, certain artificial intelligence 
practices (such as systems that have a significant potential to manipulate persons through 
subliminal techniques beyond their consciousness) are prohibited12 and artificial intelligence 
systems that are deemed to be high-risk are only permitted subject to compliance with certain 
mandatory requirements and an ex-ante conformity assessment.13 Obviously, the proposed 
regulatory framework will not apply in the United Kingdom (UK)14 and at the current moment 
in time the UK does not have a specific regulatory approach to artificial intelligence. However, 
the author is firmly of the view that developing an overarching regulatory regime could be 
rather problematic given that artificial intelligence systems are often employed for various 
purposes and normative values that need to be protected might differ significantly from one 
application to another. For example, using big data and algorithms might potentially have 
significant adverse impact on privacy of individuals and could have discriminatory 
consequences. On the other hand, utilising artificial intelligence in law enforcement might 
 
11  EU (2021/0116 (COD)). The proposal defines artificial intelligence systems widely (Title I, Article 3) but there 
is no doubt that use of big data and machine learning for underwriting or risk customisation purposes will come 
under its scope.     
12  Title II, Article 5 of EU (2021/0116 (COD)). 
13 Title III, Articles 6 and 7 of EU (2021/0116 (COD)). Annex III, lists a limited number of high-risk AI systems, 
such as artificial intelligence systems used for biometric identification and categorisation of natural persons; 
systems intended to be used for recruitment or selection of natural persons for employment;  systems intended to 
be used by public authorities to evaluate the eligibility of natural persons for public assistance benefits and services 
and systems intended to be used by law enforcement authorities as polygraphs and similar tools to detect the 
emotional state of a natural person. 
14 That said, if the proposed EU Regulation finds its way into the statute book, it will certainly have implications 
for developers of such technologies within the UK trying to sell such systems to clients based in the  EU or where 
they intend to use the outputs of such systems in relation to clients based in the EU.     
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infringe on human dignity and impose significant restrictions on liberty. Hence, an overarching 
regime might fail to achieve the desired result.15 One should also not lose sight of the fact that 
even if a framework akin to the proposed EU Regulation were to be put in place, it is highly 
unlikely that the use of big data and machine learning in risk rating process for underwriting 
purposes will be treated as a high-risk artificial intelligence system thus it will be subject to 
less onerous regulatory requirements.  
The thrust of this article is, therefore, to deliberate which fundamental values of 
consumers are at risk as a result of using big data and machine learning in risk individualisation 
and customising process. The author advocates that this area needs to be prioritised by 
regulators given the fact that using such systems on risk individualisation process could have 
adverse consequences on several fundamental rights of consumers and the fact that the current 
data protection and consumer laws fail to provide adequate degree of protection. To this end, 
the article sets out the scope and nature of such regulatory interference required specifically for 
the insurance sector to protect consumers from the unregulated and unlimited use of big data 
analytics by insurers.16 On the issue of risk customisation (e.g. use of telematics), it is 
 
15 In fact, it has been often emphasised by legal theorists that adopting a particular normative value is bound to 
influence the nature and type of regulation. See, for example, TR. Caulfield and R. Brownsword, “Human Dignity: 
A Guide to Making in the Biotechnological Era” (2006) 7 Nature Review Genetics 72; K. Tranter, “The Law and 
Technology Enterprise: Uncovering the Template to Legal Scholarship on Technology” (2011) 3 Law, Innovation 
and Technology 31. Similar points also made by various contributors in R. Brownsword, E. Scotford and K. 
Yeung (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Law, Regulation and Technology, (Oxford, 2017).         
16  It is apparent that the same degree of protection would not be required in commercial insurance context and in 
some sectors, such as marine, transport and aviation, where businesses based in various jurisdictions are the 
purchasers of such insurance, big data analytics might go a long way to bridge the information asymmetry between 
the assured and insurers.     
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concluded that the current legal rules provide an adequate degree of protection for consumers 




II. RISK INDIVIDUALISATION 
 
The algorithms and machine learning could enable insurance providers to profile each 
individual and the risk they pose to a much more granular degree. As a result of more precise 
risk profiling, as opposed to reliance on traditional generalised linear models to assess and price 
risk,18 greater segmentation of risk pools defined by various factors (such as age, gender, 
health, work and social activity, shopping preferences and even social media activity) becomes 
possible. As the theory goes, this gives insurance providers an opportunity to assign each 
individual to a risk pool that better matches its attributes. As a result of such focussed risk 
individualisation, individuals will no longer pay the average premium payable by those with 
whom they share a few actuarially relevant characteristics. At least, this is the message that 
insurers are pleased to promote as one of the breakthroughs facilitated by big data;19 and there 
 
17  As discussed below, text to n 79- n 80, the use of sensor data captured by telematics at renewal stage as part of 
risk assessment process might create similar difficulties for consumers and should, therefore, be considered as 
part of any regulatory interference in this field.        
18  For a very good  analysis of such models, see Casualty Actuarial Society, Generalised Linear Models for 
Insurance Ratings (2nd edn, 2020) <https://www.casact.org/pubs/monographs/papers/05-Goldburd-Khare-
Tevet.pdf> accessed on 15 August 2021. 
19  It needs to be stressed that computer scientists have raised concerns on the effectiveness of algorithms in risk 
granulation process. For example, it has been observed on several occasions that algorithms may act in 
unforeseeable ways. See, in particular, the examples provided by A.H. Beck (et al), “Systematic Analysis of Breast 
Cancer Morphology Uncovers Stromal Features Associated with Survival” (2011) 108 Science Transnational 
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is evidence that some insurance providers have started utilising computer algorithms to this 
effect, especially in consumer insurance.20 Naturally, insurers see this development as mutually 
beneficial, given that traditionally a considerable amount of employee time is spent on data 
processing.21    
On the face of it, limiting situations in which individuals are expected to pay for the risk 
created and damage caused by others is a very attractive proposition. However, the devil is in 
the detail. It is submitted that “risk individualisation” facilitated by big data analytics could 
create numerous difficulties that require further examination. In particular, unlimited and 
unregulated use of such analytics could infringe privacy of consumers as well as potentially 
having discriminatory consequences for those seeking insurance cover. Furthermore, as a result 
of a granular and more sophisticated risk assessment process some individuals might end up 
not being able to obtain insurance at all or can have access to insurance at a very high rate due 
to factors beyond their control, e.g. genetic predispositions. It is also possible that errors in the 
design of algorithms might create unintended consequences for consumers. The rest of this part 
 
Medicine 1. It has also been noted that artificial neural networks, often used in insurance risk assessment process, 
show a high degree of opacity. This is because in such network, all learned information is not stored at a single 
point but is distributed all over the neural net by modifying the architecture of the network and the strength of 
individual connections between neurons (represented as input “weights” in artificial networks). See, B. Walt & 
R. Vogl, “Explainable Artificial Intelligence- The New Frontier in Legal Informatics” (2018) Jusletter IT 22.             
20  See Financial Conduct Authority, Feedback Statement on Big Data Call for Inputs, (2016), at [2.21]. 
21  See McKinsley Global Institute, What is Now and Next in Analytics, AI and Automation?, (2017) 8-9,  
<https://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/mckinsey/featured%20insights/digital%20disruption/whats%20now%20a
nd%20next%20in%20analytics%20automation/final%20pdf/mgi-briefing-note-automation-final.pdf> accessed 
on 15 August 2021.   
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will engage in a legal, technical and economic exercise with the objective of suggesting 
solutions to the problems emerging.   
A. Privacy Issues 
Given the enormous capability of software platforms, which apply risk prediction models based 
on algorithms, to derive and analyse data from various sources including internet searches, 
social media accounts, shopping and purchasing information obtained from credit card 
companies, it will not be an exaggeration to suggest that privacy of customers is in peril. It is 
very likely that consumers applying for motor insurance would not know what information is 
held about them and how that information is sought to be relied upon in assessing the risk. This 
information might potentially be harvested without informed consent and often without 
knowledge of the content generators.22 There is also the risk that the information relied on for 
risk assessment may be inaccurate, though no opportunity is offered to the proposer to correct 
it. Such an intrusion of privacy could have adverse consequences for the consumer; and 
concerned about the consequences of their social network activities on their insurance 
premiums, some consumers might remove their social media accounts altogether.  
However, perhaps the most alarming issue is the lack of any time restriction on the use 
of data obtained from a social media account or another source about an individual in terms of 
risk assessment. Against the legal background that a caution or even a conviction becomes 
spent after a certain period of time and does not need to be declared for most purposes,23 it 
 
22  K. Crawford & J. Schultz, “Big Data and Due Process: Towards A Framework to Redress Predictive Privacy 
Harms” (2014) 55 B.C.L. Rev. 94, 94.  
23
  Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974 s. 4 stipulates:  
“… where a question seeking information with respect to a person’s previous convictions, offences, conduct or 
circumstances is put to him or to any other person otherwise than in proceedings before a judicial authority— 
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might come as a surprise to most that in the new brave world of insurance algorithms, a moment 
of idiocy captured on a smartphone or posted on a  social media platform creates a digital record 
and in principle remains accessible by insurers and others forever. Such data could be utilised 
by insurers to draw conclusions as to the lifestyle or personality of an assured applying for 
insurance.    
 
1. Utilising the doctrine of good faith to ease privacy concerns 
 
Privacy concerns in this context have led some commentators to seek refuge in a cornerstone 
doctrine of insurance law—utmost good faith—in order to provide a protection to consumers.  
It has been argued that the duty of good faith disclosure should be expanded to require insurers 
relying on big data to explain all risk-related information, to have an actuarial basis for the use 
of that information and to identify which risk factors have a particular bearing on the price of 
a particular risk.24 Of course, this potentially gives the assured the opportunity to correct 
inaccurate data. The judicial justification given for this stance is s. 17 of the Marine Insurance 
Act (MIA) 1906, which now simply stipulates that a contract of insurance “is a contract based 
 
(a) the question shall be treated as not relating to spent convictions or to any circumstances ancillary to spent 
convictions, and the answer thereto may be framed accordingly; and 
(b) the person questioned shall not be subjected to any liability or otherwise prejudiced in law by reason of any 
failure to acknowledge or disclose a spent conviction or any circumstances ancillary to a spent conviction in his 
answer to the question.” 
 
24  B. McGurk, Data Profiling and Insurance Law, (Oxford 2019), 158-164. 
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upon the utmost good faith” without specifying any remedy.25 It has been argued that this 
section by analogy could be utilised as the basis of implying a duty of disclosure to insurers to 
inform assureds of what information they hold following a risk assessment carried out by 
processing big data.26     
Conceptually at least, such an expansion of the duty of good faith is plausible. The 
Consumer Insurance Disclosure and Representations Act (CIDRA) 2012, which applies to any 
individual “who enters into contract wholly or mainly for purposes unrelated to the individual’s 
trade, business or profession”,27 does away with the insured’s duty of disclosure.28 However, 
the legislation is silent with regard to the pre-contractual position of the insurers. This 
presumably means that the general doctrine of good faith that applies to insurance contracts, as 
encapsulated in s. 17 of the MIA 1906, in appropriate circumstances might enable courts to 
expand the application of good faith duty to require insurers to share the details of data they 
have acquired about the assured by utilising the power of big data. At this juncture, it should 
be mentioned that the Law Commissions did not envisage that the good faith doctrine would 
have such a role. In their view, the doctrine should continue as an interpretative principle but 
should not in itself give either party a cause of action.29 However, as highlighted by several 
 
25  Amended by Insurance Act 2015 s. 14(3).   
26  See B. McGurk n 242 above, 221-225. 
27  CIDRA 2012 s. 1(1)(a). 
28  Accordingly, the main pre-contractual duty of good faith of the assured is to exercise reasonable care not to 
make a misrepresentation. In determining whether the consumer has exercised reasonable care depends on several 
factors such as i) the type of policy taken out; ii) documentation presented to the consumer; iii) the nature of 
questions a consumer was asked; and iv) whether an agent was involved in procuring the policy.    
29  Law Commission and Scottish Law Commission, Insurance Contract Law: Business Disclosure: Warranties, 
Insurer’s Remedies for Fraudulent Claims; and Late Payment, Cm. 8898, SG/2014/13, Ch 30.8. 
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commentators already, this takes a rather narrow view of the doctrine30 and is certainly out of 
line with the manner in which the good faith doctrine is developing in other jurisdictions.31 
Given that in the context of insurance contracts the parties are expected by virtue of the good 
faith doctrine to co-operate, it can hardly be suggested that it is unreasonable to expect an 
insurer at the pre-contractual stage to disclose data obtained from various sources about aspects 
of the risk or attributes of the assured.          
Be that as it may, modelling the insurer’s duty of disclosure in the context of consumer 
insurance contracts on the duty that exists in the context of business insurance contracts might 
not deliver the desired outcome. This is due to the nature of the materiality test that is relevant 
here. In a complex case concerning the extent of the insurer’s duty of disclosure at the pre-
contractual stage, the Court of Appeal in Banque Financière de la Citè v. Western Insurance 
Co Ltd32 indicated that the insurer is expected to disclose all facts known to the insurer as long 
as such facts relate to “the nature of the risk sought to be covered or the recoverability of a 
claim under the policy which a prudent insured would take into account in deciding whether or 
not to place the risk for which he seeks cover with that insurer.”33 Adopting this test of 
 
30  B. Soyer and A.M. Tettenborn, “Mapping (Utmost) Good Faith in Insurance Law- Future Conditional?” (2016) 
132 LQR 619, 622-29 and 634-35. Some commentators, on the other hand, have taken a more conservative view 
of the role that good faith doctrine could play in post contractual context, see, for example, M. C. Hemsworth, 
“The Fate of “Good Faith” in Insurance Contracts” [2018] LMCLQ 143.    
31  R. Merkin and Ö. Gűrses, “The Insurance Act 2015: Rebalancing the Interests of the Insurer and the Assured” 
(2015) 78 MLR 1004, 1026-1027. See also, B. Soyer and A.M. Tettenborn n 3028 above, 631-32. 
32  [1990] 1 Q.B. 665, reversing the judgment of the first instance [1987] Lloyd’s Rep. 69.   
33  ibid , 772. This approach to materiality found considerable support at the House of Lords even though it was 
not necessary to apply to solve the case. Lord Templeman described the reasons given by the Court of Appeal as 
“cogent”. Lord Jauncey put it in these terms [1991] 2 A.C. 249, 281: “Thus any facts which would increase the 
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materiality in the context of big data would mean that insurers are expected to disclose those 
facts which have been actuarially shown to be objectively relevant to the level of the risk. 
Accordingly, insurers who profile risks by reference to non-causal risk proxies (such as social 
media posts or shopping habits) will not necessarily be required to disclose them even if it is 
assumed that they need to operate under the umbrella of pre-contractual duty of good faith.                       
Therefore, the nature of the “materiality” test in this context imposes a significant 
limitation on the prospect of the good faith doctrine providing protection for consumers. The 
author also has significant doubts whether the good faith doctrine is the appropriate way 
forward in this debate, and these concerns will be elaborated further next.   
First, these algorithms are by nature very complex, making it difficult even for 
programmers to unravel and explain how they have reached a particular underwriting decision. 
In fact, computer scientists warn that in most systems it is not usually possible to interpret and 
explain the role of the different variables.34 That being the case, one might forcefully query 
how realistic it is to expect insurers to be able to explain to every assured the weight of the 
personal data utilised in the decision-making process.  
Second, it should be noted that such an expansion of the good faith doctrine might be 
at odds with its raison d’etre. Traditionally, one of the main justifications for the good faith 
doctrine is to deal with information asymmetry.35 Accordingly, the primary function of the 
 
risk should be disclosed by the insured and any facts known to the insurer but not to the insured, which would 
reduce the risk, should be disclosed by the insurer.” 
34 See, See the Geneva Association, Promoting Responsible Artificial Intelligence in Insurance, (2020) 
<https://www.genevaassociation.org/sites/default/files/research-topics-document-
type/pdf_public/ai_in_insurance_web_0.pdf> accessed on 15 August 2021, 11.  
35  Greenhill v. Federal Insurance Co Ltd [1927] 1 KB 65, 76 (Scrutton, LJ).  
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good faith doctrine is to ensure that the party to a contract who has the command of information 
about the risk does not abuse the other party who has no information about various risk factors. 
Given that it is the consumer who is the generator of the personal data in question, it is difficult 
to see how an insurer who attempts to make sense of such unstructured data with the purpose 
of being able to make an underwriting decision is in a better position (knowledge-wise) than 
the assured so that it needs to disclose to the assured details of the risk assessment process 
assisted by big data analytics to achieve information equilibrium.            
Third, before advocating an expansion of the insurer’s duty of good faith at the pre-
contractual stage, it is worth bearing in mind the evaluation of the doctrine of good faith in 
consumer insurance, and other developments. Less than a decade ago, it was deemed 
appropriate to remove the duty of disclosure at the pre-contractual stage for consumers with 
the introduction of CIDRA 2012. The justification given for this was that insurers now have at 
their disposal various advanced data collection tools so that they can obtain the data that they 
need to be able to engage in a rational risk assessment exercise. So, in fact it was the 
policymakers who instructed insurers to utilise big data and other tools (i.e. machine learning, 
algorithms) and not expect any disclosure about the risk from consumers, as the latter might 
not appreciate what they need to disclose. Since then, a new data protection legislation has been 
put in place to ensure that data processors, including insurers, act in a reasonable fashion when 
dealing with personal data.36 So, does it make sense to expect the insurers to disclose to 
consumers the fine details of the process of risk rating their algorithms undertake, especially 
given that in most cases it will not be possible to explain this? If we do expect such disclosure, 
there is a serious risk that this might result in a waste of effort and money in placing insurance 
 
36  Effectiveness of the relevant data protection legislation will be deliberated in the succeeding part.  
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that might push the cost of insurance up, potentially wiping out the benefits of having a more 
granular risk assessment for individuals.       
 
2. Protecting privacy with the aid of data protection legislation? 
On the premise that the long-established insurance law principle of good faith would 
not be appropriate in easing the privacy concerns of consumers, the next logical step is to 
consider whether data protection legislation could provide the appropriate level of protection 
for consumers whose personal data has been harvested and utilised by insurers for risk 
assessment purposes. The relevant legal framework in this context can be found in UK General 
Data Protection Regulation (UK GDPR), which is based on EU General Data Protection 
Regulation,37 and the Data Protection Act 2018, designed to supplement UK GDPR. There is 
no doubt that these legislative measures impose several limitations in the manner in which 
insurers could utilise big data analytics and other forms of artificial intelligence for risk 
assessment purposes.  
As a starting point, we should emphasise that these pieces of legislation do not prohibit 
insurers from obtaining personal data38 relating to consumers seeking insurance cover directly 
or from third parties for the purpose of processing (for risk assessment purposes) as long as 
various safeguards are observed.39 In particular, under this legislation insurers, as data 
 
37  Reg (EU) 2016/679. The UK GDPR is established by the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018, which 
incorporates the body of EU law (including the GDPR) as it exists on day if BREXIT, into UK law thereafter.  
38  UK GDPR, Art. 4(1) defines “personal data” as “any information relating to an identified and identifiable 
natural person”.   
39  Most significantly, it is essential to determine from the outset the purposes of processing data. The processing 
of personal data for undefined or unlimited purposes is unlawful as it does not enable the scope of the processing 
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controllers, engaged in processing special categories of data40 would require explicit consent 
from their customers.41 This would naturally require a high degree of precision and definiteness 
in the declaration of consent, as well as a precise description of the purposes of processing. Of 
course, this is a significant safeguard but in practice insurers, with the assistance of their 
lawyers, employ a clear wording in their privacy notices to achieve this consent from those 
seeking insurance cover and it is always a debateable point whether consumers giving consent 
really appreciate what they are consenting to.42                         
Another safeguard that can potentially provide a degree of protection for consumers is 
the provision of UK GDPR that gives data subjects a right not to be subjected to a decision 
based solely on automated processing (in this context “profiling”) of personal data.43 Again, 
the protection that this can provide to consumers should not be overstated. The insurers will in 
 
to be precisely delimited (Art. 5 of the UK GDPR). Article 15 of UK GDPR gives the data subjects (here 
consumers) right to request from data controllers (insurers) more extensive information about the personal data 
processed about them including the legal basis of processing, the period of data storage, information about access 
and other rights over the data (including the right to complain to the Information Commissioner Office). Last but 
not least, insurers engaged in data processing for risk assessment purposes would be required to engage in piracy 
impact assessment (Art. 35 of UK GDPR).             
40  Personal data in this context refers to data revealing “racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or 
philosophical beliefs or trade union membership; the processing of genetic data for the purpose of uniquely 
identifying an individual; the processing of biometric data for the purpose of uniquely identifying an individual; 
(d) the processing of data concerning health; the processing of data concerning an individual’s sex life or sexual 
orientation” (Art. 9(1) of UK GDPR). 
41  Article 9(2) of UK GDPR.  
42  For more detailed discussion on this point, see, R Brownsword, Rights, Regulation and the Technological 
Revolution (Oxford, 2008), Chapter 3.  
43  Article 22.  
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all probability obtain consent to carry out automated decision making,44 and in that case the 
only right of the consumer will be to seek ex post an explanation of automated decisions 
affecting them.45 However, this clearly does not require insurers to disclose the “full algorithm” 
and they can easily standardise the information provided with the aid of their lawyers to satisfy 
this requirement.        
 
 
44  It is very common today for insurance companies to require customers to sign consent forms giving them 
authority to undertake automated decision making with regard to pricing and underwriting. See, for example, the 
consent form used by one insurer < https://www.insurancecorporation.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/ICCI-
Customer-Privacy-Notice-and-Consent-Form.pdf > accessed on 15 August 2021. In the unlikely event that such 
content is not expressly obtained, it is also possible for insurers to successfully argue that profiling activities for 
underwriting purposes should be permissible as they are necessary for entering into, or performance of,  a contract 
between themselves and the data subject (Art 22(2)(a) of UK GDPR). It should be noted that there is no 
clarification as to how this criterion will apply in practice in the relevant legislation so it is ultimately left to the 
courts to determine but it is unlikely that the criterion of being “necessary” connotes indispensability. As indicated 
by I. Mendoza and L. Bygrave, “The Right Not to be Subjected to Automated Decisions Based on Profiling” in 
Synodinou (et al) (eds), EU Internet Law: Regulation and Enforcement (New York, 2017), 92, it is hard to find 
an example where an automated decision without human involvement has to occur. The same authors also 
suggested that, at 92, this criterion is presumably added to the GDPR to make it difficult for controllers to remove 
the right of subject matter to deny being subjected to such automated decision making (Art 22(1)) simply by 
pointing to standardised contract with the subject-matter. For more detailed examination on this issue, see, D. 
Sancho, “Automated Decision Making under Article 22 GDPR: Towards A More Substantial Regime for Solely 
Automated Decision-Making” in M. Ebers and S. Navas, n 5 above, 136.          
45  Articles 13 and 14 of the UK GDPR. For a detailed analysis on this matter see: M. Brkan, “Do Algorithms 
Rule the World? Algorithmic Decision Making and Data Protection in the Framework of the GDPR and Beyond” 
(2019) 27 Int J. of Law and Information Technology 91.    
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3. Suggested solution for privacy concerns 
As discussed above, the data protection legislation provide certain safeguards, which can ease 
some of the privacy concerns of consumers, but it is submitted that there are still gaps left by 
the regulatory law that can compromise the privacy of individuals: 
i) A time limit should be imposed as to how far back insurers can go in gathering and 
utilising personal information concerning individuals. To give an extreme example, 
it will not be appropriate to allow algorithms to utilise, as part of the risk assessment 
exercise, comments placed on social media years ago by an individual. The data 
controller is expected to review the need for the continued storage of personal data46 
but no restriction is imposed on how far the data controller can go back in terms of 
collecting personal data.47 This is an area that requires a careful re-evaluation.    
ii) The principles of transparency and purpose limitation that underpin the UK GDPR 
require insurers to inform data subjects if the data originally collected for a different 
purpose (i.e. data obtained from credit card companies concerning shopping habits 
of individuals) is used for a different purpose (i.e. running big data analytics to 
calculate individual premiums for health insurance; this is known as data 
 
46  Article 5(1)(e) of UK GDPR.    
47  There is, of course, a general principle in UK GDPR, Art 5(1)(a), which requires any data processing to be 
conducted fairly and it is possible that an individual could challenge an insurer’s decision to utilise personal data 
going back a long time on that ground. However, the fairness requirement under the Act is very subjective and 
there are no clear guidelines (or case law) as to how fairness in the process of processing personal data could be 
achieved. The key issue will be whether an insurer in this context could justify the use of such data for the purpose 
of a balanced risk assessment of the risk proposed.        
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repurposing).48 While informing their customers about such repurposing might not 
be a problem by utilising privacy notices, it might be difficult if not impossible for 
insurance companies to comply with this requirement if their analysis includes data 
about individuals who are not their customers. As put by one commentator, 
“Insurance companies using data mining techniques do not usually know what they 
will find until it is too late.”49 Therefore, it certainly makes sense to consider 
imposing some specific restrictions on insurance companies’ capacity to repurpose 
data.                 
iii) The increase in the volume and variety of data flows renders the data more 
susceptible to unwitting manipulation, use or disclosure; and of course there is an 
increased risk of the data being stolen or compromised as a result of a cyber-attack. 
The risk could be even higher if insurance companies delegate the task of running 
analytics to smaller insurtech providers, given that security systems of such 
companies might be easier to penetrate by external forces. It is, therefore, necessary 
to consider putting in place specific requirements as to how personal data should be 
protected by insurance companies; and no doubt procedures must be put in place 
with core security standards and prompt notification and remediation of breaches. 
The data protection legislation require data controllers to put in place technical  and 
organisational measures to ensure no accidental loss of personal data occurs50 but 
there is a case to consider standarising such procedures for insurance providers 
 
48 Article 5(1)(b) and (c) of UK GDPR.  
49  P. MacDonnell, “The European Union’s Proposed Equality and Data Protection Rules: An Existential Problem 
for Insurers” (2015) 35 Economic Affairs 225, 233.   
50  See, Art. 25(2) of UK GDPR. 
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engaged in big data analytics due to the sheer and varied amount of information 
their algorithms utilise for risk assessment purposes and the significance of ensuring 
the integrity of such data from the perspective of consumers.              
In essence, there is no doubt that relevant data protection legislation affords a degree of 
control to individuals over their personal data and requires insurers to ensure certain safeguards 
are in place to be able to process such data with the aid of artificially intelligence enabled 
processes. However, two preliminary observations are in order. First, it is not clear that 
individuals consenting to such data processing are fully aware of how much personal data 
concerning themselves can be obtained by insurers and how that data can be utilised as part of 
processing. In that sense, it is debateable whether their consent is actually an informed one. 
More fundamentally, given the significant consequences of such risk assessment might have 
on the legal position of an individual, it can plausibly be argued that those who are left in the 
mercy of algorithms deserve protection above the one provided to them by the data protection 
legislation.                       
So, what is the way forward to protect the privacy of consumers in the big data era? It is 
proposed that guidelines should be developed and imposed by regulators, possibly by the 
Financial Conduct Authority (FCA),51 as to the ethical use of big data for risk assessment 
purposes. Such regulations could restrict the use of data along the lines discussed above—with 
regard to how far back in time personal data could be searched, restrictions on repurposing 
personal data for insurance purposes, and what specific safeguards must be put in place—as 
steps that need to be taken to protect such data against cyber risks. Such regulations could be 
made part of the FCA Handbook, which are of particular relevance to the conduct of insurance 
 
51  As the body tasked in ensuring the honest and fair functioning of insurance market and protection of consumers.   
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business.52 The collaboration of the insurance sector and organisations, such as Association of 
British Insurers (ABI), at early stages of the development of such guidelines, would be 
beneficial especially given that this is an emerging area where expertise and previous 
experience are limited. In order to encourage insurers to remove any barrier to accountability, 
it is also recommended that the relevant regulation establishes a new agency that will undertake 
random auditing of the algorithms used by insurers to ensure that various algorithms in use 
function within the approved bounds. This new agency should have expertise to deal with 
technical issues relating to algorithms, but it is also essential that those serving in that unit have 
a good understanding of insurance law and regulatory guidelines developed by the FCA. It is 
submitted that an agency of this nature would serve the function of policing the use and 
development of algorithms to ensure that they comply with the standards on human rights. No 
doubt, further deliberation is necessary as to the precise powers of this agency, its relationship 
with other regulatory bodies and how it will be funded. These are significant matters that need 
to be considered with the involvement of insurance and consumer representatives and 
regulators.              
 
B. Discrimination 
Obviously anti-discrimination legislation would not allow the use of data that have a high risk 
of discrimination through having a considerable disparate impact on protected characteristics. 
In the UK, the Equality Act 2010 is the basis for this kind of legal protection; it prevents 
insurers from using algorithms that would seek information that might lead to a discrimination 
 
52  An appropriate place for such regulations would be the Conduct of Business Source Book (COBS) and 
Insurance: Conduct of Business Sourcebook (ICOBS). The former applies to firms that carry our life insurance 
business, and the latter to firms that carry out insurance business.      
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based on protected characteristics (i.e. age, disability, gender assignment, marriage or civil 
partnership, race, religion or belief, sex and sexual orientation).53  
This much is clear and uncontentious. It is possible that indirect discrimination could 
still take place even though the algorithms used are not programmed to take into account a 
protected characteristic in risk individualisation process but the actual effects of 
individualisation carried out by the algorithms would be particularly disadvantageous for 
people possessing a protected characteristic.54 Several commentators share the view that this 
kind of discrimination (also known as “unintentional proxy discrimination”) is the inevitable 
consequence of algorithms which are designed to find linkages between input data and target 
invariables, irrespective of the nature of these linkages.55 For example, a programme would 
obviously not be designed to discriminate against women, but certain proxies, such as the 
colour or model of the car, might accidentally recreate side effects or bias that a human would 
not have voluntarily incorporated into the system. It is also possible that unintended 
discrimination could creep in as a result of the data used to train algorithms not being 
sufficiently representative. Put differently, biased training data may lead to discriminatory 
models either because the training data may view historical data influenced by prejudice as 
valid examples or it may draw inferences based on a limited or biased sample of the 
 
53  Equality Act 2010, ss. 4-12.  
54  It is worth noting that this is recognised as “indirect discrimination” under Equality Act 2010, s. 19, and is 
prohibited.  
55  J.M. Skopek, “Big Data Epistemology and Its Implications for Precision Medicine and Privacy” published in 
I.G. Chen (et al) (ed), Big Data Health and Bioethics, (Cambridge, 2008), 30; S. Barocas and A. D. Selbst, “Big 
Data’s Disparate Impact” (2016) 104 Calf. L. Rev. 671, 712 and L Edwards and M Veale, “Slave to the Algorithm? 
Why A ‘Right to Explanation’ Is Probably Not the Remedy You Are Looking For?” (2017) 16 Duke L Tech Rev 
18, 25.  
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population.56 One should also not dismiss the possibility that algorithmic learning can go awry 
resulting in unintended discrimination. Computer scientists have discovered that a neural 
network called CycleGAN, used in image to image translation, learned to hide information 
concerning the original image inside the generated one in the form of a low-amplitude high-
frequency signal.57 This was not an isolated case and it is obvious that a similar mishap could 
arise in the operation of algorithms used by insurers for risk assessment purposes potentially 
leading to unintentional proxy discrimination. 
What options are open to regulators to eliminate unintended discrimination that can 
arise as a result of a high volume of data that can be obtained and analysed by algorithms? 
Regulators can employ various techniques to prevent this kind of discrimination happening. 
Perhaps the most straightforward solution to the problem of discrimination fuelled by big data 
is to allow only certain pre-approved variables, determined by regulators, to be used by 
algorithms in the risk assessment process. This might be easy to implement, but it will also 
remove most of the benefits that granular risk classification brings. Put differently, this kind of 
solution is counter-productive, as it will take away the innovative edge that big data analytics 
brings to insurance practice. Also, this solution does not tackle the problem of algorithms or 
data collection systems being adversely affected by human prejudice.   
 
56  S. Barocas and A. D. Selbst, “Big Data’s Disparate Impact” (2016) 104 Calf. L. Rev. 671, 680. See, also the 
Geneva Association n 32 above, 12-13. 
 
57  C. Chu, A Zhmoginov and M Sandler, “CycleGAN, A Master of Steganography” (2017) NIPS Machine Deception 
Workshop.     
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Another potential solution is to allow insurers to utilise any data legally available but 
require them to explain to regulators the impact of their algorithms on members of protected 
groups.58 This might work if insurers are able to explain that a variable used in risk assessment 
and causally linked to the desired outcome (risk individualisation) is not acting as a proxy for 
a protected characteristic. Of course, showing a causal link in this context is not an easy task, 
but regulators could set the standard of proof low and expect a plausible causal link to be shown 
rather than requiring a definitive proof of causalty.59 The task is by no means a simple one, but 
it will certainly mean less interference from the regulators. The regulators (or a new agency set 
up) will have to randomly audit insurer’s classification systems looking at the “data sets 
minded” by algorithms as well as the “source codes and programmers” notes’ describing the 
variables, correlations and inferences embedded in the algorithm.60 These audits should focus 
on whether personal data is appropriately scrubbed from the data used to create predictions, 
whether insurers are gathering inappropriate individual data (these dealing with privacy issues 
discussed in earlier part) and whether the data are suggesting inappropriate correlative 
predictions. As indicated earlier, it is vital that the personnel carrying out such audits have 
technical and legal knowledge to be able to assess the appropriateness of the algorithms used 
for risk individualisation.          
 
58  S. Hoffmann, “Big Data’s New Discrimination Threats: Amending the Americans with Disabilities Act to 
Cover Discrimination Based on data-Driven Predictions of Future Disease” in G. Cohen, H.F. Lynch and E. 
Veyena (eds), Big Data, Heath Law, and Biometrics, (Cambridge 2018), 85.  
59  J. Gaulding, “Note, Race, Sex and Genetic Discrimination in Insurance: What’s Fair?” (1995) 80 Cornell L. 
Rev. 1646, 1681.   
60  D. K. Citron and F. Pasquale, “The Scored Society: Due Process for Automated Predictions” (2014) 89 Wash. 
L. R. 1, 23.  
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C. Errors and System Vulnerability 
As has already become clear from the discussion, algorithms used for data profiling operate on 
the basis of correlation, not causation. This creates a risk that the algorithms might at times 
find correlation in the data analysed with statistical significance even though there is no 
meaningful correlation between the variables.61 An example would suffice to illustrate the 
issue.  A big data analysis might reveal that from 2006 to 2011, the US murder rate was well 
correlated with the market share of Internet Explorer, as both went down sharply, but it is hard 
to imagine that there is any meaningful causal relationship between the two.62 Also, it should 
be borne in mind that due to the large scale of data processed by such algorithms, a small 
systematic error might have far-reaching consequences in terms of risk assessment.  
Whilst this is not something attributable to the way algorithms operate, it should also 
be kept in mind that input errors or missing data on the documents or data that have been 
analysed could also contribute to inaccurate risk profiling by algorithms. The health sector, in 
particular, is susceptible to such errors. For example, it has been observed in the United States 
that clinicians entering data into electronic health records may choose erroneous diagnosis 
codes, check boxes incorrectly or uncheck boxes inappropriately if the default setting has all 
boxes checked.63 Similarly, data about treatment outcomes is often missing from electronic 
health records. Patients who are given medications, such as antibiotics, are not often asked to 
 
61  This is technically known as the “problem of overfitting”.  
62  G. Marcus and E. Davies “Eights (No, Nine!) Problems with Big Data” NY Times, 6 April 2014 
<https://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/07/opinion/eight-no-nine-problems-with-big-data.html> accessed on 15 
August 2021.     
63  F. Magrabi et al., “An Analysis of Computer-Related patient Safety Incidents to Inform the Development of A 
Classification” (2010) 17 J Am. Med. Informatics Ass’n 663, 665 and 669. 
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return to the doctor and report on their progress. This might lead to a situation where the 
patient’s health record will detail the diagnosis and prescription but will not indicate whether 
the patient has recovered or failed to improve and sought treatment from a different specialist.64     
Last but not least, it is hardly an overstatement to suggest that cyber risks, whether 
unintentional (e.g. program bugs) or intentional (e.g. malicious cyber attacks), will become 
increasingly more significant as more insurers begin to employ artificial intelligence and rely 
on big data analytics for risk assessment. Any bug or infiltration of the programmes used for 
data analysis could lead to the system making extremely suboptimal decisions.  
The author’s intention by highlighting these difficulties is to stress the point that to utilise 
the potential of big data analytics in insurance law, there is a need to consider putting in place 
a regulatory framework pointing out how such algorithms should operate, and to introduce an 
audit requirement carried out by regulators (or the new agency set up for this purpose) on the 
systems that will be employed by insurers. That way any potential vulnerabilities and errors in 
the system or in the manner data is collected could be identified and eliminated.                                  
 
D. Insurability Problem 
One potential problem associated with an increased level of risk individualisation as a result of 
big data analytics is that insurance might become unaffordable or unavailable for certain groups 
of people. Imagine a consumer who has a genetic predisposition that raises the risk of a certain 
illness. This is clearly a factor beyond that individual’s control; but big data analytics, armed 
with additional data such as medicines ordered by that individual from the internet, or searches 
 
64  C. Newgard et al., “Electronic Versus Manual Data Processing: Evaluating the Use of Electronic Health 
Records in Out of Hospital Clinical Research” (2012) 19 Acad. Emergency Med. 217, 225.   
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undertaken by that individual with regard to certain medical conditions, might enable insurers 
to place that individual into a high risk category, making life insurance or critical illness 
insurance cover unaffordable. This may raise social concerns, in particular if the risk is 
correlated with low income and low wealth. It is a relief that in the UK the potential destructive 
impact of indiscriminate use of genetic data on certain individuals has attracted attention. The 
ABI entered into a voluntary moratorium with the Government in 2011,65 which commits 
insurers offering life, critical illness and income protection insurance not to ask their customers 
about predictive genetic test results when applying for insurance.66  
This is a positive development,67 but given the immense potential big data analytics 
presents to individualise risks, it is necessary to give some thought as to whether there are other 
sectors in which risk individualisation should not be allowed. One area that springs to mind is 
risks created as a result of climate change. If big data analytics have the capability of identifying 
certain correlations making it difficult for consumers who live in a particular location to obtain 
insurance cover for their homes, policymakers should consider whether the solidarity principle 
should prevail to prevent such data from being available for risk assessment purposes.68  
 
65  Code of Genetic Testing and Insurance <https://www.abi.org.uk/globalassets/files/publications/public 
/genetics/code-on-genetic-testing-and-insurance_embargoed.pdf> accessed on 15 August 2021.  
66  This voluntary agreement is still in force but it does not apply to diagnostic genetic tests, nor does it apply to 
non-genetic medical tests (i.e. blood or urine tests for cholesterol, liver function or diabetes).      
67  The position is similar in many other jurisdictions. For example, in Switzerland, insurance companies are barred 
from utilising presymptomatic or prenatal genetic tests in their underwriting process (The Federal Act on Human 
Genetic Testing (HGTA) Art. 27).  
68
 On a related matter, in the UK in areas where there is serious risk of flooding, insurers could pass part of their 
exposure to a reinsurance company established for this purpose, Flood Re. This arrangement has been put in place 
28 
 
Another area that requires attention is the position of those who will not be able to purchase 
insurance at an affordable rate as a result of granular risk profiling provided by algorithms. 
Assume the position of an individual who does not suffer from any genetic disorder but is not 
leading a healthy lifestyle and as a result of big data analytics (e.g. information obtained from 
his/her medical records, internet searches, shopping and eating habits), s/he is identified as a 
bad risk. Naturally, most insurance providers will refrain from offering him/her life or critical 
illness insurance at an affordable rate or at all. This might pose a problem for the government. 
On one hand, given that this individual’s predicament is the result of his/her choices, one can 
plausibly argue that there is no need for government or industry interference. Equally, it can be 
argued that in the absence of such granular risk assessment this individual would have been 
offered insurance at a reasonable rate so s/he should not be penalised due to the fact that 
technology allows us to better profile risks. The author has less sympathy for the latter 
argument; however, if the government decides to intervene in this instance, the next issue is 
going to be deciding the nature of such intervention. One possibility is to provide premium 
subsidies to those who are in that category. Some commentators believe that providing 
premium subsidies is the best form of intervention to an insurance market, as this does not 
distort the price mechanism, leading to inefficiencies, and allows positive effects of premium 
 
to ensure that insurers do not refrain from insuring house cover to individuals living in locations susceptible to 
flooding. The pool of money to cover claims made on policies which are in the scheme will come from two 
places—the charge for each policy which is passed into Flood Re, and an additional annual £180 million levy on 
UK home insurers. Flood Re also has its own reinsurance policy in place to ensure it will be able to cope with 
significant or multiple floods. This arrangement is a good illustration of intervention to the market in an area 
where risk individualisation would have reduced the prospect of finding adequate insurance cover.     
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differentiation to be maintained.69 An alternative could be to establish a scheme of insurance 
of last resort for such individuals similar to Flood Re. However, it should be noted that the 
position of those who price themselves out of the insurance market due to their personal choices 
is not similar to those who happen to own a house exposed to natural disasters created by 
external factors; so it is unlikely that government would be willing to invest into an insurance 
scheme to protect them. Still, the use of data analytics becoming more common would bring 
these issues to the fore, and more through debate on them needs to be carried out.                                        
 
E. Price Discrimination 
A controversial aspect of big data analytics is that it might potentially enable insurers to 
determine which of their customers are sensitive to prices so that they can charge higher prices 
to those willing to pay more. Essentially, this means that insurers could utilise non-causal risk 
proxies (e.g. shopping habits or internet searches) to determine whether a potential customer is 
willing to pay more for the same product as opposed to others who are in the same risk category. 
Put differently, the big data analytics might provide insurers with a very powerful weapon so 
that they quantify the premium the customer will be asked to pay based on their willingness to 
pay rather than their riskiness. Most insurers will view this as part of their price optimisation 
 
69  See, C. Kousky and H. Kenreuther, “Addressing Affordability in the National Flood Insurance Programme” 
(2014) 1 Journal of Extreme Events 1450001. 
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strategy, although this might not be a view widely shared by most consumers.70 It is also worth 
noting that such practices are banned in some jurisdictions.71  
The arguments on this matter are finely balanced but it is submitted that no interference 
from regulators is necessary for the following reasons:    
i) Judged purely from an economic perspective, it is possible that price discrimination 
might have a positive effect on society. Assuming that additional profits generated 
from those who are willing to pay more for their insurance cover are utilised by 
insurers to offer insurance to those who would normally not be willing to purchase 
insurance at the going rate, this will contribute to an expansion of insurance in the 
population. Insurers might see a benefit in engaging in this kind of exercise to 
maximise their profit margins by attracting new business, and they could use the 
additional funds generated from price discrimination as an incentive to this end.  
ii) Approaching the issue from a behavioural economics perspective, it is possible that 
some consumers might benefit further from price discrimination. Imagine that a 
consumer is quoted a premium by an insurer slightly lower than other offers. To an 
insightful consumer this is a signal that s/he is regarded by that insurer, following 
an assessment by data analytics, as a low-risk customer, enabling such customer to 
 
70  Empirical studies have shown that price discrimination will often be regarded as unfair if it exceeds a certain 
level. See, for example, K.L. Haws and W.O. Bearden, “Dynamic Pricing and Consumer Fairness Perceptions” 
(2006) 33 Journal of Consumer Research 304.    
71  In California, for example, the Insurance Commissioner has prohibited price optimisation in his Notice 
Regarding Unfair Discrimination in rating: Price Optimization. Price optimisation has been described as “any 
method of taking into account of an individual’s class or willingness to pay higher premium relative to other 
individuals or classes”.     
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use this information against the insurer by insisting on an even lower premium. 
Taking this theory to its natural conclusion, one might suggest that in a world in 
which insurers know more about policyholders than the latter know about 
themselves, pooling and attendant risk-spreading will actually increase, and to be 
able to stick to the pool rate will be the best the insurers hope to do.72 
iii) In a market which functions in an efficient manner, there is every reason to believe 
that competition between insurers will restrict their ability to exert aggressive price 
discrimination.  
iv) Last but not least, from a regulatory perspective it remains a possibility that a 
consumer could claim that an extreme degree of price discrimination based on non-
causal risk proxies is a violation of the FCA Principles for Business (PRIN) 
Handbook73 or the rules in ICOBS,74 enabling him/her to make a complaint to 
Financial Ombudsman Service75 or bring a claim for damages against a regulated 
insurance provider under s. 138D of the FSMA 2000.76 Put differently, there are 
 
72  P. Siegelman, “Information and Equilibrium in Insurance Markets with Bog Data” (2014) 21 Conn Ins. L. J. 
317, 333-336.  
73  For example, PRIN Handbook 2.1.1.1 reads: “A firm must conduct its business with integrity.” In a similar 
vein, 2.1.1.6 requires that “a firm pay due regard to the interests of its customers and treat them fairly.” 
74  ICOBS 2.5.1 reads: “A firm must act honestly, fairly and professionally in accordance with the best interests 
of its customer.”   
75  Financial Services and Markets Act (FSMA) 2000, s. 228(2) provides that a “complaint is to be determined by 
reference to what, in the opinion of the ombudsman, is fair and reasonable in all circumstances of the case.”    
76  This provision enables persons who suffer a loss as a result of a breach of a rule made by the FCA to have a 
right of action for those losses. The measure of damages under this provision is likely to be no different from that 
which could be recovered for breach of contract or tort and the same approach to causation, foreseeability and 
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legal mechanisms open to any individual who can show that s/he has suffered from 
the effects of price discrimination.                      
 
III. RISK CUSTOMISATION 
 
Sensor technology, by increasing connectivity and enabling continuous monitoring through the 
mobile network, provides opportunities for insurers to utilise various devices to obtain real-
time data on the subject matter of insurance. There is no denying that the use of such devices 
could yield several benefits for the assured. It is possible, for example, that such digital 
monitoring could provide real-time insights to policyholders on their risk behaviour and 
incentivise them to reduce their risk. Also, continuous collection and analysis of behavioural 
data enables dynamic risk assessment, providing an opportunity for consumers to obtain 
personalised insurance cover. This would potentially mean a reduction in motor insurance 
premiums for better drivers and cheaper life/critical illness cover to those who eat healthy diets 
and exercise a lot. Consumers could also benefit from the additional variety of products that 
insurers can offer as a result of the use of such devices. In motor insurance, for example, several 
insurers offer use-based insurance as telematics help them to determine with precision how 
much the insured vehicle is used and in what geographical limits.  
Approaching the mater from the perspective of insurance law, one can envisage such 
devices having an impact particularly on two aspects of the insurance relationship: 
 
remoteness is likely to apply (see, Rubenstein v. HSBC Bank Plc [2011] EWHC 2304 (QB); [2011] 2 C.L.C. 459, 
[117] (HJJ Havelock-Allan).      
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i) Insurers could utilise the additional real-time data obtained as part of the risk 
assessment process especially in determining the premium for renewals or 
extensions; and   
ii) Insurers could utilise the additional data by adding new clauses into the contract 
designed to limit and/or control risk alteration. 
There can be no doubt that using the real-time data obtained by sensor technology in risk 
assessment process could raise issues, such as privacy and discrimination, as discussed in 
the earlier part, as well as some other legal issues.77 On the other hand, as will be deliberated 
further in this part using real-time data as a means of limiting the scope of cover do not 
create similar problems for consumers.78    
A. Impact of Sensor Data on Risk Assessment 
The fact that such devices will provide insurers with real-time data on key matters concerning 
the risk (i.e. driving habits or lifestyle of the assured) means that insurers will have a significant 
amount of additional data that they can draw upon for risk assessment purposes. Insurers could 
utilise this additional data creatively. Some insurers, for example, offer the assured the prospect 
of reducing the insurance premium if it is established with the aid of this additional data that 
the risk score of the assured is better than the score calculated at the outset. However, it is 
certain that the additional real-time data will be of great assistance to insurers when they 
consider offering renewals or extensions to the cover. At this juncture, a difficulty highlighted 
earlier might rear its head again! It is a serious possibility that a consumer might find it difficult 
to obtain insurance cover at an affordable premium if the data transmitted through such devices 
contribute to him/her being classified as a bad risk. When it comes to home or motor insurance, 
 
77  See text to n 80 - n 86 below.   
78  See text to n 87- n 108 below. 
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the author believes that this is a situation that individual has created as a result of his/her 
behaviour, and it is only fair that the individual concerned is responsible for the financial 
consequences of his/her actions. Besides, as indicated above, s/he has an opportunity to react 
to this situation by altering his/her behaviour going forward. The matter is slightly different 
when it comes to health or life insurance. The real-time data obtained from individuals with 
high health-related risks (not induced by their own lifestyle choices) would mean that they will 
face high and potentially unaffordable premiums which would no doubt limit their access to 
basic medical service provision, leading to a further deterioration of their condition. As 
discussed above, this is an area that requires further discussion, especially as to whether a 
regulatory interference to the market conditions would be required.79 By the same token, 
utilising real-time data obtained through sensor technology in risk assessment process (e.g. for 
the purposes of renewals or extensions to cover) could potentially raise privacy and 
discrimination issues discussed above under the heading of  “risk individualisation”. The author 
is of the firm view that use of such data should be restricted and algorithms that utilise such 
data in risk assessment should be subject to audit along the lines discussed earlier.80                        
Furthermore, issues concerning the potential use of the data obtained from these devices 
could arise. UK GDPR gives the data subject a new right to request the data controller to 
provide him/her with a copy of his/her personal data in a structured, commonly used and 
machine readable format and also request the data controller to transfer this data to another 
controller.81 Therefore, insurers are under an obligation to provide data obtained from 
telematics or wearables with regard to the consumer in question to him/her or other insurance 
 
79  See, text to n 654 - n 679 above  and the discussion on the insurability problem.   
80  See, text to n 51 – n 52. 
81  Article 20 of UK GDPR. 
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companies if requested by the consumer. That much is clear. A more difficult legal question 
will emerge if insurers attempt to claim ownership of such data with a view to exploiting it 
commercially by dictating in the insurance contract that the data obtained though such devices 
become their property. It is a debateable point whether ownership claims made in contract 
terms will be effective.82 However, perhaps this is not a practical problem at this stage as we 
have not come across any standard insurance contract where insurers claiming ownership of 
such data.          
It is also important to bear in mind that under the current data protection legislation 
there is no restriction on the ability of an insurer to utilise the real-time sensor data obtained 
from telematics or wearables for another purpose, in assessing risk for another product, as long 
as the individual is given notice that such data will be used as part of risk assessment. It is, 
therefore, essential to devise guidance on the ethical use of sensor data by insurers along the 
lines discussed above.83 
Last but not least, we could not turn a blind eye to the fact that sensor data might introduce 
some novel vulnerabilities for the insured property. Imagine a situation where hackers manage 
 
82  It should be noted that UK courts have taken the view that data are not eligible to be subject of common law 
lien (Your Response v. Datateam Business Media [2014] EWCA Civ 281; [2015] Q.B. 41) and no proprietary 
right is deemed to exist in the context of an email (Fairstar Heavy Transport NV v. Adkins [2013] EWCA Civ 
886; [2013] 2 C.L.C. 272) but with the developments in digital technology one should expect further legal 
developments in this area. At EU level, the Court of Justice in UsedSoft GmbH v. Oracle International Corp, C-
128/11, seemed to open the door for a discussion on ownership in intangible assets by holding that the commercial 
distribution of software via a download on the internet is not only based on a licence but on a sale of goods. For 
a detailed analysis on this case, see, T. Hoeren, “Big Data and Ownership in Data- Recent Developments in 
Europe” (2014) 36 EIPR 751.         
83  See, text to n 5149 – n 531 above. 
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to gain access to a property for burglary by utilising the network system that operates a home 
telematic device. It is possible that this might trigger penalties for the insurer under the data 
protection legislation.84 But more significantly, if the resulting loss is not covered under the 
policy, the assured would be able to make a claim from the insurer who owns such a sensor 
device for failing to exercise due diligence to prevent such cyber attacks85 leading to the loss 
not covered by the policy.86 At first sight, these eventualities might seem far-fetched, but every 
disruptive new technology is capable of creating such novel problems and it is likely that such 
issues might be faced by insurers when the use of such technology becomes common in the 
market.                              
 
B. Creating Tailor-made Clauses to Deal with Risk Alteration by Utilising Sensor 
Data    
In insurance law, it is open to a policyholder after attachment of the risk to alter the nature of 
the risk without the consent of the insurer.87 In practice, however, risk control clauses are often 
employed by insurers to restrict this freedom. The main objective of a clause of this nature is 
 
84  The Information Commissioner Office under the UK GDPR and Data Protection Act 2018 can issue fines of 
up to four percent of a company’s annual global turnover, or £ 17.5 million (whichever is greater) for failure to 
secure data concerning individuals.    
85  In most policies, insurers exclude liability for any loss, damage liability or costs caused by inaccuracies in the 
data collected by the telematics device; but this kind of exclusion clause would not protect them against 
vulnerabilities in the system that enables access to hackers.     
86  This might create the need for insurers utilising such devices to consider purchasing cyber risk insurance cover.  
87  Chief Baron Pollock in Baxendale v Harvey 157 E.R. 913 (Ex Ch), 915-916, famously said: “If a person who 
insures his life goes up in a balloon, that does not vitiate his policy…. A person who insures may light as many 




to ensure that the risk is maintained by the assured at the same level agreed at the inception. 
Traditionally, warranties88 are the most common risk control clause89 used in insurance law.90  
Telematics, which enables insurers to track the activities of the assured during the 
currency of the policy, could play a vital role in the quest of insurers to prevent risk alteration 
and determine the scope of the cover available. In contemporary policies, we are witnessing an 
increased use of such clauses especially in instances where the use of telematics is common. 
For example, in motor insurance policies, clauses are incorporated into the contracts, putting 
restrictions on the use of the insured car. In some policies it is stated that the insured car will 
not be driven more than X miles from the assured’s home. Similarly, there might be a term 
stating that the insured car will not be driven at certain times of the day, eg between 8 a.m. and 
10 a.m. or when it is in an unroadworthy condition. In some policies, there are terms where the 
assured warrants that the insured car will not be driven above the legal speed limits or when 
under the influence of alcohol or drugs. Some of the clauses are more draconian, allowing 
 
88  In a technical sense, an insurance warranty is an undertaking by the assured that “some particular thing shall 
or shall not be done”, or that “some condition shall be fulfilled”. Such warranties relate to facts after the attachment 
of the policy and are often known as future (or continuing) warranties. Some warranties, on the other hand, are 
undertakings whereby the assured “affirms or negatives the existence of a particular state of facts”. A warranty of 
this nature is known as an affirmative warranty or a warranty that relates to a period before the attachment of the 
risk. 
89  Other risk control mechanisms often used are: i) condition precedents to liability of the insurer (breach of such 
clauses either entitle the insurer to elect to discharge from the contract or prevent the assured from claiming for a 
particular loss); ii) suspensory provisions (also known as “clauses delimiting the risk”), which set out the 
circumstances in which the insurer is to be on risk; and iii) exclusion clauses.      
90  This is not the only function that an insurance warranty serves. Some warranties (i.e. affirmative warranties) 
intend to circumscribe the risk to which the insurer subscribes.      
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insurers to cancel the policy if the assured displays some kind of unacceptable driving 
behaviour.91 Again, in instances where the insurers make use of home telematics, we often see 
warranties requiring the assured to keep various loss preventive devices (e.g. fire and burglar 
alarms) operative during the policy period. Needless to say, telematics makes it possible to 
monitor compliance with this kind of term.    
As long as such terms are written in plain language and transparent, the author finds it 
difficult to put forward any reason as to why any restriction on their use should be imposed. 
Terms designed to prevent the assured from altering the risk have been traditionally 
incorporated into insurance contracts. For example, most assureds who took motor insurance 
policies in the 1920s would warrant that they would maintain the insured vehicle in an 
“efficient” or “roadworthy” condition, and an insurer who could prove that the vehicle was not 
 
91 See for example, Condition 8, Unacceptable Driving Behaviour, in HughesDrive, an insurance policy which 
reads:  
“You and any additional drivers must observe the law at all times. Poor driving behaviour by any drivers 
(including driving at speeds which exceed the speed limit for the road on which the car is being driven) will affect 
your Driving Style Score. If the HughesDrive® App detects that your Driving Style Score is Red, a score less 
than zero, for any given week, you will receive notification. If, following this notification, you have a Red Driving 
Style Score for a further week, a final notice will be issued. Three consecutive weeks, or a total of five weekly 
scores which are Red during the life of your policy (including the week which prompted the original notification), 
will result in your policy being cancelled in accordance with the cancellation section of the private car policy 
booklet. In addition to this, we and/or the Insurer reserve the right at any time to provide you with seven days’ 
notice and cancel your policy forthwith in the event that excess speed is detected. You have the right to appeal 
any decision made concerning your or any named driver’s driving behaviour by contacting Hughes Insurance.” 
 A copy of the terms can be found at <https://www.hughesinsurance.co.uk/pdf/Telematics-Customer-Terms-
Conditions.pdf> accessed on 15 August 2021. 
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in such a state would have had a defence to any claim arising out of an accident involving the 
insured vehicle.92 So why should things be different if an assured today warrants that the 
insured vehicle would not be used at certain times of the day but an incident occurs and the 
telematics confirm that the vehicle was in use during those times? Likewise, if a home 
insurance policy requires a fire alarm to be kept operative during the policy, and home 
telematics informs the assured of a malfunction in his/her fire alarm system but s/he fails to 
take any action (ie fails to prevent a risk alteration), could any objection be raised for that 
particular assured not being able to recover for a loss caused by a fire? 
Of course, this is not to say that validity of such terms could not be challenged under 
consumer protection legislation or regulations put in place to regulate the conduct of business 
of insurers. However, it is highly unlikely that terms used in the market concerning telematics 
or wearables will fall foul of such statutory provisions. For example, a warranty in a telematics 
motor policy that requires the assured not to drive the insured vehicle when under the influence 
of alcohol or drugs is unlikely to be viewed as unreasonable under Rule 2.5.1 of ICOBS,93 
affording a consumer assured a right of action for damages for breach of statutory duty under 
s. 138D of the FSMA 2000.94 Even a term affording the right of the insurer to cancel the 
 
92  See, for example, Jones v. Provincial Insurance (1929) 35 LIL. Rep. 135 (KB). 
93  This Rule reads: “A firm must not seek to exclude or restrict, or rely on any exclusion or restriction of, any 
duty or liability it may have to a customer or other policyholder unless it is reasonable for it to do so and the 
duty or liability arises other than under the regulatory system.” 
94  In Parker v. National Union Mutual Insurance Society [2012] EWHC 2156 (Comm); [2013] Lloyd’s Rep. I.R. 
253, a term that required the assured to provide all written details and documents requested by the insurer was not 
deemed to be contrary to the rules stated in ICOBS, as it could not be said that such term could give rise to a 
significant imbalance in the rights of parties, given that the assured alone possessed the information which might 
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contract if the assured displays unacceptable driving behaviour as captured by telematics is 
unlikely to be viewed as “unreasonable” given that such a right usually crystallises only after 
the assured engages in a very unacceptable form of driving, and under such terms it is common 
to give a notice of cancellation to the assured and some time before cancellation becomes 
effective so that s/he can make alternative insurance arrangements.95 For the sake of 
completeness, it should also be stressed that the author does not believe that the Consumer 
Rights Act (CRA) 2015 alters the position in favour of the assured, either. Even though s. 62(1) 
 
be required by the insurer. By analogy, it can be said that a term that puts restriction on the actions of the assured 
that are in his/her control is unlikely to give rise to a significant imbalance in the rights of parties.           
95
  For example, MYPOLICY, a commonly used telematics motor insurance policy, states:  
“When your car is driven in a dangerous or unacceptable manner and statutory speed limits are exceeded 
the following conditions shall apply: Conditions Action +45mph is recorded in a 30mph zone +60mph 
is recorded in a 40mph zone +75mph is recorded in a 50mph zone +90mph is recorded in a 60mph zone 
(Above are all examples of where the road speed limit has been exceeded by more than 50%) (this will 
result in your insurance policy to be cancelled). Your telematics smart box will trigger a notification to 
us and we will notify you that a process of cancellation has started. Speed in excess of 100pmh is recorded 
(this will result in your insurance policy to be cancelled). Your telematics smart box will trigger a 
notification to us and we will notify you that a process of cancellation has started. The Telematics Smart 
Box data will trigger a notification to us and we will contact you. If the excessive speed limits detailed 
above are exceeded regardless of the allowable number of high-risk journeys, your policy will be 
cancelled. We will contact you (using the contact details you have provided) to explain that your policy 
will be cancelled in 7 days because the vehicle was driven in a dangerous manner at speeds exceeding 
the speed limits shown above. We will confirm this to you by e-mail or write to you at your registered 
address providing you with a 7-day notice of cancellation.”  
 
A copy of the terms can be found at <https://www.mypolicy.co.uk/media/1118/telematics_car_insurance 
_terms_and_conditions_v31pdf.pdf> accessed on 15 August 2021. 
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of the 2015 Act provides that a term that is judged to be unfair will not be binding on 
consumers, s. 64(1) clearly states that a term of a consumer contract may not be assessed for 
fairness “if it specifies the main subject matter of the contract, or if the assessment concerns 
the appropriateness of the price payable under the contract by comparison with the goods, 
digital content or services supplied under it” as long as this term is “transparent and prominent 
to an average consumer”.96 When this section is read in conjunction with the explanatory notes 
that accompanied the EU legislation forming its origins97 and the reasoning of English courts 
 
96  Section 64(2)-(5). When requested to construe the scope of this exception in the context of Art 4(2) of the 
Unfair Terms Directive 93/13/EEC, the provision which forms the origins of s. 64 of the CRA 2015, the Court of 
Justice of the European Union (CJEU) expressed the view in Caja de Ahorros y Monte de Piedad de Madrid, C-
484/08, [32], that it is up to the national courts having jurisdiction, following a case by case examination, to form 
the view whether the relevant terms were drafted by the seller or supplier in plain, intelligible language. The 
Supreme Court, by utilising the flexibility afforded by the CJEU, adopted a broad interpretation of Art 4(2) of the 
Directive in Office of Fair Trading v. Abbey National plc [2009] UKSC 6; [2010] 1 A.C. 696. There, the OFT 
challenged whether charges for unauthorised overdrafts fell within this exception. The Supreme Court held that 
the bank charges constituted part of the price or renumeration for the bank services provided. On that basis, 
provided they were in plain and intelligible language, the banks’ overdraft charges could not be assessed for 
fairness. Although this broad construction adopted by the Supreme Court has been criticised in some academic 
circles (see, for example, S. Whittaker, “Unfair Contract Terms, Unfair Prices and Bank Charges” (2011) 74 MLR 
106 and M Kenny “Orchestrating Sub-prime Consumer Protection in Retail Banking: Abbey National in the 
Context of Europeanised Private Law” (2011) 19 ERPL 43), there is little doubt that the reasoning holds true in 
the context of s. 64 of the CRA 2015 which does not alter the exceptions in any significant manner apart from 
requiring that the term  is brought to the consumer’s attention in such a way that an average consumer would be 
aware of the term (in addition to transparency requirement). It is fair to say that the CRA 2015 supports a market-
led approach which expects consumers to be self-reliant and protect their own interest.           
97 This section replaces relevant parts of the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999, which was 
designed to implement the EEC Unfair Consumer Contract Terms Directive 93/13/EEC, into English law. Recital 
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on the matter,98 it is clear that any term in an insurance contract excluding or restricting the 
scope of the cover will not be subject to the fairness test referred to in s. 62(1) of the CRA 2015 
as long as it is transparent and brought to the attention of an average consumer. This will 
certainly be true for a term in a consumer insurance motor policy that affords a remedy for the 
insurer in a case where telematics confirm unacceptable (dangerous) driving practice 
demonstrated by the consumer for a sustained period of time. Ultimately, insurance cover here 
is offered on the basis that the risk will be retained at a particular level (i.e. the assured will not 
alter the risk by engaging in unacceptable and/or dangerous driving behaviour during the 
currency of the policy).99 If the assured acts contrary to this term, by virtue of the relevant term 
the process of cancellation commences. This is a very clear indication that the relevant clause 
is one that defines or circumcises the insured risk and ultimately the liability of the insurer so 
it is highly unlikely that it needs to be subjected to the “fairness” test stipulated in s. 62.100                    
 
19 of the Directive 93/13/EEC, stated: “… in insurance contracts, the terms which clearly define or circumcise 
the insured risk and the insurer’s liability shall not be subject to such assessment [fairness] since these restrictions 
are taken into account in calculating the premium paid by the consumer.”       
98  See, in particular, Parker v. National Union Mutual Insurance Society n 89 above. Teare, J, held that a term 
that puts the assured under an obligation to do things which are in his/her control could not be struck down by the 
Unfair Terms in Consumer Regulations 1999 (which forms the basis of the relevant sections of the Consumer 
Rights Act 2015). See also, Office of Fair Trading v. Abbey National plc [2009] UKSC 6; [2010] 1 A.C. 696.   
99  In the context of insurance law, such terms are invariably regarded as essential terms of the contract. See, for 
example, Simpson SS Co Ltd v. Premier Underwriting Association Ltd (1905) Com Cas 198 and Farr v. Motor 
Traders’ Mutual Insurance Society Ltd [1920] 3 K.B. 669.  
100 This is an outcome which is in line with the view expressed by the CJEU in Árpád Kásler, Hajnalka Káslerné 
Rábai v. OTP Jelzálogbank Zrt, C-26/13, [49], to the effect that a term in a contract that is not subject to “fairness” 
test is one that lays down “the essential obligations of the contract and, as such, characterise it.” 
43 
 
Leaving consumer protection legislation aside, it should be noted that general insurance 
rules might provide some degree of protection to assureds who might face restrictions imposed 
by telematics insurance policies. Imagine for example, a telematics home insurance policy 
which requires the assured with a warranty to keep the burglar alarm in an operative condition 
during the policy period. A defect in the burglar alarm is identified by telematics and although 
the assured is informed no corrective action is taken. A few days later, the insured property is 
damaged as a result of a storm affecting the region. Normally, in case of breach of an insurance 
warranty, the cover is suspended until the breach is remedied,101 but s. 11 of the IA 2015 
stipulates that the assured will be indemnified for a loss occurring at a time when a warranty 
(or term) is not complied with if i) compliance with the warranty (or term) in question would 
tend to reduce the risk of loss of a particular kind, loss at a particular location or loss at a 
particular time; and ii) the assured demonstrates that non-compliance with the warranty (or 
term) could not have increased the risk of the loss which actually occurred in the circumstances 
in which it occurred.102 To seek refuge in this section, the assured in the light of the loss arising 
must first establish that the warranty (or term) that is breached is intended to reduce the risk of 
loss of a particular type or at a particular location or at a particular time. The test that is 
introduced here is an objective one and it essentially attempts to identify whether compliance 
with the warranty (or term) is thought to reduce the chances of the particular type of loss being 
suffered. Turning to the example above, the assured would possibly be able to establish that 
the relevant warranty would objectively tend to reduce the risk of break-in (and related events 
 
101  Insurance Act (IA) 2015, s. 10.  
102  It is not possible for insurers to contract out of this provision in consumer insurance policies (IA 2015, s. 15). 
However, in commercial insurance policies, it is possible to contract out of these provisions subject to 
transparency safeguards as set out in s. 17. 
44 
 
such as arson and vandalism). This will mean that the insurer’s liability in respect of break-in 
would be suspended during the period of breach. If, however, a loss arises as a result of another 
peril, i.e. storm, that is not connected to unauthorised entry into the premises, that loss will be 
covered as the assured in all probability will be able to demonstrate that non-compliance with 
the warranty (i.e. burglar alarm not being in operation) could not have increased the risk of loss 
caused by storm.103     
 
However, one should not lose sight of the fact that s. 11 of the IA 2015 does not apply 
to a warranty (or term) that is designed to describe the limits of the cover as a whole. Put 
differently, if a warranty (or term) has the effect of limiting the scope of cover generally as 
opposed to limiting the effect of a breach in relation to a specific risk, the assured will not be 
able to rely on s. 11 if a loss occurs during the period of breach. This would mean that if a 
telematics motor policy imposes a warranty to the effect that the insured car should not be 
driven X miles from the assured’s home, the assured will not be able to recover for a loss that 
arises beyond those limits.104 By a similar token, a telematics motor policy that stipulates that 
 
103 However, difficulties can arise in some cases. For example, in the scenario discussed above, assume that the 
cause of the loss is fire. The insurer in that case might potentially argue that a burglar alarm that is sensitive to 
motion might have detected the fire spreading and alerted the residents and possibly emergency services, so non-
compliance in this case did in fact increase the risk of the loss which actually occurred in the circumstances in 
which it occurred. This is certainly a plausible argument that insurers can take. Therefore, one cannot help thinking 
that one effect of s. 11 will serve more than introducing causation by the back door! See, B. Rix, “General 
Reflections on the Law Reform” in M. Clarke and B. Soyer (eds), The Insurance Act 2015 (Oxford 2017), 120-
121.   
104  See, the judgment of the Queensland Supreme Court in Stapleton v. NTI Ltd [2002] Q.D.C. 204 that considers 
the issue from the perspective of a similar legislation.  
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the insured car would not be used at certain times of the day will not respond to a claim that 
arises from a loss occurring during those hours. Of course, it is inevitable that boundary 
disputes will arise. Imagine that in a telematics motor insurance policy there is a warranty or 
condition precedent requiring the insured vehicle to be kept “in a roadworthy condition at all 
times”. Also imagine that the assured drives the car when headlights are not working during 
the daytime and a collision occurs as a result of another driver hitting the insured car from 
behind. The assured could plausibly argue that the term was designed to reduce the risk of loss 
when the car is driven at night with no functioning headlights so the breach here (driving when 
headlights not fully functioning during daytime) could not have increased the risk of loss in the 
circumstances in which it occurred. Equally, it is plausible for the insurer to argue that this is 
a risk-defining clause and it imposes a restriction (driving only when roadworthy) that relates 
to the risk as a whole, so s. 11 is not relevant here. It is the author’s opinion that the latter 
argument is more palatable and it is very likely that the assured’s cover will remain suspended 
during the period when the insured vehicle was used when headlights were not functioning.   
 
It needs to be emphasised that cancellation clauses do not come under the scope of s. 
11. Hence, it is no surprise to see most telematics motor insurance providers opting to utilise 
cancellation clauses that allow them to cancel the policy if it is recorded that the insured driver 
has engaged in dangerous driving patterns (e.g. repeatedly driving over speed limits). However, 
there is convincing judicial authority to the effect that in cases where the insurer is entitled to 
exercise discretion under the policy on the basis of information obtained (e.g. utilising a right 
of cancellation), the insurer is expected to exercise this discretion in a reasonable fashion, 
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without arbitrariness, capriciousness or perversity.105 The legal basis of this qualification 
remains uncertain. Some commentators associate it with the duty of good faith,106 although the 
precise ambit of the application of good faith principle in this connection is far from being 
clear.107 Assuming that the continuing duty of good faith has a role to play here, it is likely that 
it will require the insurer that obtains information from telematics about the driving behaviour 
of the assured not to act dishonestly, improperly, capriciously or arbitrarily.108 However, it 
should be borne in mind that most cancellation clauses used in telematics motor insurance 
policies stipulate that insurers will notify and explain the reasons of exercising the right of 
cancellation to their assureds. This is a clear sign that insurers are well aware of the fact that 
their cancellation right is subject to various limitations imposed by law, and it is rather unlikely 
that they would act in an arbitrary fashion when exercising a right of cancellation after having 
obtained data from telematics indicating unreasonable driving behaviour of the assured.                         
 
Last but not least, it should be noted that under the Road Traffic Act 1988, the insurer might 
be prevented from relying on some of the risk control clauses that might appear in a telematics 
motor insurance policy to deny cover against third parties. Section 148(2) of the Road Traffic 
Act 1988, inter alia, stipulates that a third party liability insurer cannot rely on matters such as 
 
105  See, for example, Groom v. Crocker [1939] 1 K.B. 194 (CA), 203 (Sir Wilfrid Green MR); Cox v. Bankside 
Members Agency Ltd [1995] C.L.C. 671 (CA), 680 (Sir Thomas Bingham MR).   
106  B. Soyer & A.M. Tettenborn, see n 3028 above, 625-26. 
107 For example, Pill, LJ, in Drake Insurance Plc v. Provident Insurance Plc [2003] EWCA Civ 1834; [2004] 
Q.B. 601 (CA), [177]-[178] was adamant that continuing duty of good faith can be breached by an insurer even 
in the absence of fraud.    
108  See, also, Socimer International Bank Ltd v. Standard Bank London Ltd [2008] EWCA Civ 116; [2008] 1 
Lloyd’s Rep. 558 (CA) and Paragon Finance Plc v. Nash [2001] EWCA Civ 1466; [2002] 1 W.L.R. 685 (CA).  
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the age, physical condition, or mental condition of persons driving the vehicle, the condition 
of the car, or the time at which or the areas within which the vehicle is used. That means that a 
warranty that requires the insured car not to be driven at certain times or outside  a geographical 
limit cannot be used to deny liability to third parties if the insured vehicle is involved in an 
accident during those times or outside those geographical limits. The same is true in relation to 
a term that requires the car to be driven in a “roadworthy” condition or a term preventing the 
insured to drive the insured car when under the influence of drugs or alcohol. In those 
circumstances, an insurer who pays out a third-party claim could seek to recover this sum from 
the assured under s. 148(4) of the Road Traffic Act 1988.                 
 
 
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
 
Big data analytics and artificial intelligence are rapidly changing the way insurers run their 
businesses. They particularly assist insurers i) to individualise the risk assessment process at a 
granular level and ii) to customise insurance products they offer to the public. It is argued in 
this article that consumers are not necessarily in a worse position in terms of ii), as consumer 
legislation and general principles of insurance law could ensure that the use of algorithms and 
artificial intelligence do not provide any unfair advantage to insurers.109 However, it has been 
also asserted that uncontrolled use of data analytics and algorithms in the process of risk 
assessment could create various difficulties for consumers since the existing legislation, in 
particular data protection legislation, could not afford the required degree of protection for 
consumers. It has been illustrated that there are legitimate concerns as to whether the privacy 
 
109  This remains the case as long as real-time data obtained by sensors is not utilised as part of any risk 
assessment for renewals and extensions.  
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of consumers can be adequately protected. It is also potentially possible that the use of 
algorithms might lead to indirect discrimination in some cases against some consumers, as such 
programmes are designed to find linkages between input data and target invariables irrespective 
of the nature of these linkages. There is also the potential of errors in the data collection or data 
analysis that can create unforeseen consequences for some assureds. Last but not least, it has 
been illustrated that a granular risk assessment might create insurability problems for some 
group of people (especially those who have genetic or chronic health problems). This is an 
issue that policymakers need to consider seriously, as it might be necessary to show solidarity 
and preclude the use of certain types of data from the risk assessment process.  
 
The main conclusion emerging from the article is that it is essential to consider 
regulating further the use of algorithms and big data analytics especially in the process of risk 
assessment. The issues that need to be considered carefully by policymakers have been 
highlighted in this article. Also, it has been suggested that there is a need to establish a new 
agency that can undertake the task of running random audits to ensure that the algorithms used 
are within the parameters set.  
 
This technology presents great opportunities for insurers. And, there is certainly 
something to be said about getting the right balance in regulating a new area of development, 
since over- regulation could prevent this technology from achieving its full potential. It is 
evident that some degree of regulation beyond the current legislation of data protection is 
required so that this technology is used in a fair and transparent fashion in the risk assessment 
process. It is hoped that the insurance sector recognises this and even perhaps plays an active 
role in shaping the regulatory framework in this area.                                      
 
 
